Showing posts with label investment banker. Show all posts
Showing posts with label investment banker. Show all posts

May 22, 2013

Roth Capital Drops Coverage of $PVCT Due to the Departure of the Equity Analyst

Dr. Yale Jen, PhD, who had covered the company at Roth Capital, appears to have left the firm. He was brought on board in February 2012 when Roth expanded its healthcare practice. See the cached version of the webpage below.


Below is the current webpage.


As a result of Yale's departure, Roth dropped coverage of Provectus.


I cannot easily find where Dr. Jen currently is work wise.

I suppose his departure might, in part, be chalked up to his inability to bring business to Roth; that is, unbeing able to convince Provectus (perhaps among others) to engage Roth in investment banking services in exchange for equity research coverage. Or, he may have left for a better opportunity.

I do not believe Yale had published any notes on Provectus since April 2012.

May 17, 2013

$PVCT: Bank of America Visits The Blog


A quick visit (from New York), so don't read too much into it at this point (the Google search terms employed to arrive here were "connecting the dots provectus").

Still, it's interesting, to me at least, that both Pfizer and Bank of America, Provectus' informal financial adviser until it becomes the company's formal adviser when so engaged, visited the blog on the same day.

January 29, 2013

$PVCT: Maxim Group -- Melanoma leading PV-10 development with liver cancer following; Reiterate Buy and $3.50 PT


Maxim Group analyst, Dr. Echo He, MD, PhD, issued an equity research note today on Provectus. Management circulated the report via Provectus News.


Dr. He's $3.50 price target, which is mostly irrelevant to me (coverage is more important), did not change from her previous reports. The price target also remained the same as the price target of her predecessor, Dr. Yale Jen, Ph.D., who now is at Roth Capital. Because of management's refusal to play the Wall Street game, generally speaking, equity research reports like these have some but not extensive value.

I do not think she changed top line revenue figures to reflect the addition of a liver indication, although she did make expense reductions in her model. The analyst also did not include the potential, probability-adjusted value of out-licensing opportunities in China or elsewhere.

As such, the $3.50 price target yields a baseline valuation of about $400MM market capitalization (using Dr. He's diluted shares outstanding) that effectively is a reasonable estimate of liquidation value to which the current share price and market cap must catch up. This value of course is nearly or completely illiquid because management would never monetize the company at this level.

Further increases in either price targets or actual market cap obviously will be based on key and pivotal milestones actually being achieved.

October 29, 2012

$PVCT.OB: Did Some Shareholders Sabotage the $PVCTP "IPO," and Other Stories Stranger Than Fiction

As the events of the week of October 15 fade into memory, do we know more than less?

Peter's sense of value. I was gratified to confirm Peter's valuation expectations during his discussions with prospective financial leads investors like Aisling Capital and OrbiMed Advisors. You will recall I blogged about my thoughts about PVCTP "IPO" terms on September 23rd. I characterize them as "my thoughts," but I think of them as what Peter may have thought/did think at the time. My expectation of the PVCTP share price was too high (he was at $4, while I thought $5-6). I met expectations with the conversion ratio (he was at 1-to-1, and I thought the same) and the warrant coverage range of 40-60%. These parameters suggest a pre-money valuation of $614MM (using a fully diluted share base of 152MM as at June 30) vs. a $96MM pre-money figure using Friday's $0.63 common stock closing price.

Are we clear? Yes sir. Are we clear? Crystal. Peter was clear as crystal about his pricing expectations for the PVCTP "IPO," were he to utilize it for Provectus. That one other person with whom I interacted during that period of time had a good handle on this suggested Peter kept his cards very close to his vest about his discussions with prospective lead investors (other than to repeatedly say he would not do a bad or dumb deal) and angered or frustrated shareholders who could not or did not successfully read or believe him.

Greedy or sabotage? Did certain shareholders try to sink the PVCTP "IPO" purposefully or inadvertently? Earlier this year I wrote a blog post where I calculated (very roughly) Provectus' pre-money valuation before several investment rounds it consummated with institutional and accredited investors, going back several years. My intent was to highlight how I thought management approached fund raising, which was to raise the amount of money they needed for various reasons and ensure there was some cushion of cash available, and no more. The PVCTP "IPO" was, in my view, a much more of a formal raise, where the process of fund raising was as visible and awareness generating as the ticker symbol was to have been. There is no doubt Maxim Group made mistakes and Network 1's Keith Testaverde did Provectus no favor with his e-mail, but did certain shareholders actively push down the stock either to get a more favorable deal (thinking Peter indeed would do a dumb or bad "IPO") or simply kill the vehicle to which they were vehemently opposed for philosophical (?) reasons?

Value is as value does. I think I learned my/a lesson about trying to have a constructive e-mail dialogue with angry longtime Provectus shareholders. Next time, I won't give out my first name. I jest, and I digress. One such shareholder (angry, "long suffering" and, in my view, intellectually inconsistent) thought I must have been smoking something green, white or otherwise pharmaceutical if Provectus would be sold for $50-60 per share. I draw inspiration and cogency from a large shareholder who frames his view on valuation this way (paraphrasing):
  • If I am dead wrong about PV-10 (i.e., it is "only" a loco-regional treatment), the stock is worth $5.
  • If I am wrong (i.e., it's got systemic treatment "potential"), the stock is worth $10.
  • If I am right (i.e., it is a systemic treatment), well then...
While $50-60 per share is the price for which Craig would sell the company, I think he is a pragmatic individual about valuation. He does not strike me as idealogical about this topic. I am sure he, together with Provectus' board of directors and well-heeled financial advisers (Bank of America/Merrill Lynch, not Network 1), will evaluate bids from Big Pharma companies and make the right decision for shareholders and management.

At the same time, the man understands what he has created. And day by day, the world of Big Pharma is catching on to it.

In my head exist many different kinds of trading and investing personalities, because different situations demand different approaches. Those personalities need data and information to inform their decisions. I cannot say with conviction, yet, what I think Provectus is truly worth and for what others would pay. I need more information. I am, however, guided by management's views on the topic, which are informed by others.


I will know what Provectus is worth when I see it; that is, the valuation that reflects what it is worth. 

The momentum trader in my head is whistling "Rocket Man" now.

August 26, 2012

Consultants

I previously highlighted the warrant issuance below noted in the Q1 2012 10-Q filing:


Following up on this thread, now from the Q2 10-Q filing:


1,003,000 issued in Q1. Another 454,500 in Q2. Different consultants? The same consultant? Pardon the pun, but what kind of relationship warrants these amounts (this amount) of warrants?